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COUNTY NO. 13-2538 
APPELLANT'S SRI IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case raises two important questions. First, whether the Idaho Court of 
Appeals erred by issuing a purely advisory opinion on an issue of first impression 
regarding the Idaho Constitution. And, second, whether Article X, Section 5 of the 
Idaho Constitution, which places the duty to control, direct, and manage parole on the 
Board of Correction, precludes a parole officer from delegating her duties to local police, 
thus making them "agents" of the Board. 
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FILED-COPY 
APR 16 2015 
Supreme .... ~ -
Entered on ATS by 
Dustin Thomas Armstrong pied guilty to grand theft after an on-call parole officer 
asked the Boise Police to search ~.1r. Armstrong's car, purportedly according to a waiver 
provision in Mr. Armstrong's parole agreement. That provision provided that 
Mr. Armstrong would submit to a search of person or property, including his vehicle, "at 
any time and place by any agent of Field and Community Services."1 During the 
search, the police found a safe containing financial documents belonging to 
Mr. Armstrong's mother and charged Mr. Armstrong with grand theft. Mr. Armstrong 
filed a motion to suppress that evidence, arguing that the Boise Police were not "agents" 
within the terms of his parole agreement. After the district court denied the motion, 
Mr. Armstrong entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal from the 
denial of the suppression motion. 
On appeal, Mr. Armstrong argued that the Boise Police could not be "agents" of 
probation and parole under the parole agreement because Article X, Section 5 of the 
Idaho Constitution specifically places the non-delegable duty to control, direct, and 
manage parole on the Board of Correction. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
Mr. Armstrong's conviction in a published opinion. See State v. Armstrong, 2015 
Opinion No. 6 (Feb. 12, 2015) (the "Opinion"). The Court of Appeals held that, because 
Mr. Armstrong did not raise the Article X, Section 5 issue below, it was not preserved. 
(Opinion, pp.4-6.) But because of the "high likelihood" that the constitutional issue 
would arise in the future, the Court of Appeals went on to decide that Mr. Armstrong's 
Article X, Section 5 argument had no merit. (Opinion, pp.6-8.) 
1 According to the State, Field and Community Services no longer exists, but was 
renamed the Bureau of Probation and Parole. (R., p.102.) To prevent confusion, 
Mr. Armstrong will refer to that agency as "probation and parole." 
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Mr. Armstrong asks that this Court review this case. Although he requests 
review of all the issues, the most compelling reason for review is the Court of Appeals' 
handling of the merits of this case. The Court of Appeals contravened this Court's 
general prohibition of advisory opinions when it purported to decide, in lengthy and 
detailed dicta, the merits of this case. In doing so, the Court of Appeals also incorrectly 
decided an issue of first impression regarding the Idaho Constitution. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Thirty-five year old Dustin Armstrong was a parolee under the supervision of the 
Board of Correction. (Tr., p.24, Ls.18--22.)2 As part of his parole agreement, he agreed 
to "submit to a search of person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at any 
time and place by c.1ny agent of [probation and parole] and s/he does waive 
constitutional right to be free from such searches." (Ex.1 to 7/3/13 Suppression 
Hearing.) 
One evening in February 2013, Mr. Armstrong's mother came home to find her 
car running in the driveway with the doors and windows open. (Tr., p.29, L4 - p.30, 
L.1.) When she asked Mr. Armstrong what he was doing, he said he was charging his 
cell phone. (Tr., p.30, Ls. 2-6.) She told him, "this isn't right," and asked him to leave, 
so he did. (Tr., p.30, Ls.4-7.) Mr. Armstrong returned the next morning. (Tr., p.30, 
Ls. 7-8.) He asked his mother whether there were any accounts with money in them for 
him. (Tr., p.30, Ls.15-17.) She denied having any accounts or any money. (Tr., p.30, 
2 The record on appeal includes two transcripts. A transcript of the hearing on 
Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress held on July 3, 2013, and, as an exhibit, a transcript 
of the preliminary hearing. All transcript citations in this brief are to the transcript of the 
hearing on Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress. 
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Ls.-18-19.) He told her "[t]hat's fine. I'll have my attorney take care of it" (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.20-21.) Mr. Armstrong's mother could tell he was "distracted," and having seen him 
on methamphetamine before, she felt he was high, so she told him to pack his things 
and leave. (Tr., p.30, Ls.23--25, p.34, Ls.18--22.) Mr. Armstrong informed his mother, "I 
just want you to know, Mom, when I turn 39, I will have family benefits on my dead 
mom." (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-5.) His mother went to her sister's house, called the police, and 
reported that she believed her son was using drugs. (Tr., p.31, Ls.6--10.) 
Officer Mattie Chally of the Boise Police Department received a dispatch 
"narcotics call" about Mr. Armstrong. (Tr., p.47, Ls.6-10.) She then called the "on-call 
probation and parole phone number" and spoke to Laila Jeffries. (Tr., p.48, Ls.5-6, 
p.50, L.25 -- p.51, L.1.) Ms. Jeffries is a probation and parole officer, although she did 
not supervise Mr. Armstrong. (Tr., p.36, Ls.2-5, p.38, L.15.) About once a year, she 
has a shift where she is the on-call officer, meaning she has a phone which law 
enforcement can call. Ms. Jeffries testified that officers like Officer Chally "call us all the 
time on it." (Tr., p.37, Ls.4-13.) "[P]retty much all of the time, if I get a phone call that 
they've got a parolee or probationer pulled over, I ask for a K9 search of the vehicle." 
(Tr., p.39, Ls.1-4.) Her standard response to hearing that a parolee has been stopped 
for running a stop sign is, "[y]es, he's on parole. Can you please search through the 
vehicle for me?" (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-20.) She regularly has other agencies conduct 
searches: "[l]t's just the way we do things." (Tr., p.42, L.21 - p.43, L.8.) 
Officer Chally spotted Mr. Armstrong leaving his mother's house and followed 
him to a local credit union. (Tr., p.48, L.11 - p.49, L.16.) True to form, Ms. Jeffries 
asked Officer Chally to do a K9 search of Mr. Armstrong's car. (Tr., p.38, Ls.7-23.) 
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Ms. Jeffries could have gone down to assist in the search, but didn't. (Tr., p.44, Ls.23-
25.) Rather, she simply told Officer Chally, "[i]f you find anything, if you need me down 
there, I'll come down." (Tr., p.44, L.12--17.) In fact, no one from probation and parole 
went to where the police confronted Mr. Armstrong. (Tr., p.44, Ls.20-22.) 
Mr. Armstrong was inside the bank when two uniformed officers approached him. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.10-25.) They asked to speak with him, so Mr. Armstrong went outside 
with them. (Tr., p.1 ·1, L.24 - p. ·12, L.15.) At that time, the officers were not aware of 
any crime that Mr. Armstrong had committed. (Tr., p.73, L.24 - p.74, L.2.) When 
speaking with the officers, Mr. Armstrong was "calm," "easy, laid-back going," "polite, 
very respectful" and cooperative. (Tr., p.59, L.23 - p.60, L.2, p. 79, Ls.10---12.) So the 
officers pat-searched him. (Tr., p.61, Ls.12-14.) 
While two officers detained Mr. Armstrong, Officer Challey had Officer Jerry 
Walbey run a K9 search on Mr. Armstrong's car. (Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) The dog did not 
alert when he was run on the outside of the car. (Tr., p.91, Ls.5-15.) So Officer 
Walbey put the dog in the car. (Tr., p.91, Ls.16-18.) Once inside, the dog alerted on a 
safe behind the driver's seat. (Tr., p.89, Ls.23-24.) It turned out that the safe belonged 
to Mr. Armstrong's mother, Mr. Armstrong had never opened the safe before, and 
Mr. Armstrong did not know what was in the safe. (Tr., p.93, L.19 - p.94, L.16.) His 
mother claimed that she had never stored any drugs in the safe and none were found 
inside. (Tr., p.94, Ls.15-16, p.95, Ls.3-5.) 
The State charged Mr. Armstrong with grand theft for taking the safe, which had 
contained a "checkbook and/or financial documents" belonging to his mother. 
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(R., pp.37-38.) Counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
warrantless search of Mr. Armstrong's car. (R., pp.54-55, 63--64.) 
The district court initially granted Mr. Armstrong's motion, finding that the search 
was unreasonable and that "Boise City police are not agents of [probation and parole]," 
such that "the scope of the search exceeded that that (sic] was permitted by this waiver, 
and therefore was an unlawful search." (Tr., p.121, L.23 122, L.17.) The State filed a 
motion to reconsider asserting that any law enforcement officer acting on behalf of 
probation and parole is permitted to conduct searches of a parolee under the plain 
language of Mr. Armstrong's waiver because they are agents of probation and parole. 
(R., pp.96-97.) The State also asserted that probation and parole had delegated the 
task of searching Mr. Armstrong's vehicle to the Boise Police. (R., pp.1Ol-103.) On 
reconsideration, the district court denied Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress. The court 
found that "[t]he parole agent in this case authorized Boise City Police Officers to act in 
her place in conducting a search of [Mr. Armstrong's] vehicle. This is the very definition 
ofan agent." (R., pp.116-117.) 
Mr. Armstrong entered into a binding plea agreement with the State, reserving 
his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.126-27.) After 
sentencing, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and Mr. Armstrong timely 
appealed. (R., pp.134-41.) 
On appeal, Mr. Armstrong argued that the search of his vehicle fell outside of the 
scope of the parole agreement because Article X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution 
specifically places the duty to control, direct, and manage parole on the Board of 
Correction, and so an on-call parole officer cannot delegate that duty to local police. 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Armstrong's conviction in a published opinion 
in February 2015. The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Armstrong had failed to preserve 
the Article X, Section 5 issue. (Opinion, pp.4-6.) But because of the "high likelihood" 
that the constitutional issue would arise in the future, the Court of Appeals went on to 
decide that Article X, Section G did not preclude parole agents from delegating the duty 
to search a parolee to the local police, and therefore the search fell within the scope of 
Mr. Armstrong's parole agreement. (Opinion, pp.6-8.) Finally, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's decision that the Boise Police acted as "agents" within the 
plain language of the parole agreement. 3 (Opinion, pp.8-10.) 
3 Mr. Armstrong will not address that portion of the Court of Appeal's decision because 
Mr. Armstrong conceded on appeal that the Boise Police purported to act as agents 
within the terms of his parole agreement. However, that finding is irrelevant if 
Mr. Armstrong prevails on his Article X, Section 5 argument. 
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ISSUES 
1. Are there special and important reasons for this Court to review this case? 
2. Given that Article X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution places the exclusive duty 
to control, direct, and manage parole on the Board of Correction, did the district 
court err when it determined that an on-call parole officer can delegate that 




There Are Special And Important Reasons For This Court To Review This Case 
This Court may grant a petition for review only "when there are special and 
important reasons" for doing so, but, uitimately, the decision of whether to grant review 
lies within the sound discretion of this Court I.AR. 118(b). In exercising that discretion, 
the Court must consider the following non-exhaustive factors: 
·1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the 
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further appellate 
review is desirable. 
I.A. R. 118(b ). 
There are special and important reasons for this Court to review this case. 
Despite deciding this case on the preservation issue, the Court of Appeals contravened 
this Court's general prohibition of advisory opinions by purporting to decide the merits of 
this case. In doing so, the Court of Appeals incorrectly decided an issue of first 
impression regarding the Idaho Constitution. 
A. The Court Of Appeals' Unusual Decision On This Constitutional Issue Of First 
Impression Runs Afoul Of This Court's Prohibition Of Advisory Opinions 
Despite explicitly deciding that Mr. Armstrong did not preserve the constitutional 
issue, the Court of Appeals purported to decide the constitutional issue because of the 
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"high likelihood" that it would come up again in the future. (Opinion, p.6.) In doing so, 
the Ccurt of Appeals did not mention this Court's general prohibition of advisory 
opinions, nor did it discuss whether it would be appropriate to issue an advisory opinion 
in this case. (See id.) This unusual decision, which contradicts this court's general 
prohibition of advisory opinions, warrants review. 
"This Court is not empowered to issue purely advisory opinions."4 Taylor v. AIA 
Servs. Corp., 15·1 Idaho 552, 569 (2011) (citing MOS lnvs., L.L.C. v. State, 138 Idaho 
456, 464-65 (2003)); State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 9 (2010) ("In effect, the State is 
asking this Court to issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid the issue in future cases; 
an exercise this Court will not undertake."). However, "[t]his Court can always exercise 
its discretion to consider additional matters under its plenary jurisdiction." Izaguirre v. 
R & L Carriers Shared Servs., 155 Idaho 229, 232 (2013) (citing ID. Cm-JST. art. V, § 9 
("The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the 
district courts ... "). But see State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 869, 871 (2009) (in which this 
Court remanded after discussing Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32, which was not 
raised below, but did not cite to Article V, Section 9 to support that unusual advisory 
ruling). 
This Court "rarely exercise[s] this plenary power of review, which [it] narrowly 
appl[ies] and limit[s] to compelling cases." State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 24 (2014 ). For 
4 "[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has used the term 'advisory opinion' to denote a 
number of different judicial actions, including judgments subject to later review by other 
branches of the federal government, formal advice on proposed courses of conduct, 
decisions in moot or unripe cases, decisions in cases in which the plaintiff lacks or 
arguably lacks standing, and any portion of an opinion not absolutely necessary to the 
resolution of the case (i.e., obiter dicta)." Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional 
Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1998) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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example, an advisory opinion may be warranted if the case "presents an important issue 
that will provide helpful guidance to the affected legal community," or involves an 
"important and reoccurring question[] in the construction of criminal statutes, the 
resolution of which will be of practical importance in the administration of the criminal 
justice system in this state and prevent improper dismissals and reduce erroneous 
rulings." Id.; see also State v. Loomis, 146 Idaho 700, 704 (2009) ("Historically, [this 
Court has] rarely invoked [its] plenary power, and generally only do[es] so to clarify 
important points in the construction of criminal rules and statutes which are likely to 
recur in the future."); Turpen, 147 Idaho at 87'1 (finding "it appropriate to give guidance 
to the courts of this State in dealing with [frequently recurring] requests for 
expungement of court records," even though the parties had not addressed i.C.A.R. 32 
below). 
Although this Court has recognized that it has the discretion to issue advisory 
opinions, it does not appear that this Court has condoned the Court of Appeals' use of 
advisory opinions. See State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168, 170-72 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(surveying decisions either issuing or declining to issue advisory opinions, but not citing 
any decision in which the Court of Appeals issued an advisory opinion). Mr. Armstrong 
contends that the Court of Appeals should not have the authority to issue advisory 
opinions. But, even if it did, the Court of Appeals should not have issued an advisory 
ruling in this case. 
Only this Court should have the authority to issue advisory opinions because only 
this Court, as the court of last resort in Idaho, can serve the underlying purpose of 
advisory opinions. This Court will issue an advisory opinion only in narrow and 
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compelling circumstances in which an important issue is likely to recur. See Glenn, 156 
Idaho at 24; Loomis, 146 Idaho at 704; Turpen, 147 Idaho at 871; Long, 153 Idaho at 
'170-72. In fact, that is the precise reason why the Court of Appeals issued the advisory 
opinion in this case--it believed the issue was highly likely to recur. (Opinion, p.6.) But 
an advisory opinion issued by this Court will undoubtedly have a very different effect on 
a recurring issue than will an opinion from the Court of appeals. An advisory opinion 
issued by this Court sends a clear message to litigants and the lower courts-although 
that decision is not binding, the Court will decide that particular issue in that particular 
way if it comes before the Court again. But the sarne opinion from the Court of Appeals 
reads differently-the Court of Appeals may decide that particular issue in that particular 
way if it comes before them again, but the Idaho Supreme Court may in fact disagree 
with Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Opinion's only practical effect is to discourage 
defendants from asserting the same argument Mr. Armstrong asserted here. But 
because the merits of the Opinion are merely advisory dicta, and this Court has yet to 
decide the issue, defendants will be free to raise this issue in the district courts and 
appeal the issue to the Idaho Appellate Courts, thus undermining the very purpose of 
issuing an advisory opinion in the first place. 
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals has the authority to issue advisory 
opinions, it should not have done so in this case. Here, the Court of Appeals purported 
to decide an issue of first impression regarding the Idaho Constitution, not the mere 
construction of criminal rules and statutes. See Glenn, 156 Idaho at 24; Loomis, 
146 Idaho at 704. And, as explained above, the fact that this issue may come up again 
in the future not validate the Court of Appeal's decision to issue an advisory opinion 
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because the Opinion will in no way prevent this issue from reoccurring. See Glenn, 
156 Idaho at 24; Loomis, ·145 Idaho at 704. Finally, the Opinion is not necessary to give 
guidance to the effected legal community. See Glenn, 156 Idaho at 24. It appears that 
local police and probation and parole are already acting consistently with the Opinion 
(see Tr., p.39, Ls. ·1-4, p.41, L:12 - p.42, L.24 ), and defense attorneys are still free to 
argue that delegations from probation and parole to local police are unconstitutional. 
In short, the Court of Appeals should not have the authority to issue advisory 
opinions, but, even if it does have that authority, it should not have done so here. The 
Court of Appeals' unusual attempt to decide an issue of first impression regarding the 
Idaho Constitution in lengthy and detailed dicta is a special and important reason for this 
Court to review this case. 
B. The Court Of Appeals Incorrectly Decided This Issue Of First Impression 
Regarding The Idaho Constitution 
On appeal, Mr. Armstrong relied on the non-delegation doctrine to argue that 
because Article X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution places the duty to control, direct, 
and manage parole on the Board of Correction, the Board cannot simply excuse itself 
from that duty by delegating it to another entity. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.) Therefore, 
the on-call parole officer did not have the authority to delegate her constitutional duty to 
the Boise Police, and the Boise Police could not have been "agents" within the scope of 
Mr. Armstrong's parole agreement. (Id.) 
The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court of Appeals narrowly construed the 
non-delegation doctrine to prohibit only the delegation of decision-making authority, 
without regard to the precise duty the delegating entity is charged with. (Opinion, p.7.) 
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From that premise, the court concluded that "performing a search is not equivalent to 
engaging in 'the control, direction and management' of parole and parolees." 
(Id. (quoting ID. CONST. art. X, § 5).) The court reasoned that "[a]lthough performing 
parole searches is a part of that duty, it does not involve any decision-making authority 
if done at the request and under the direction of a parole officer." (Id. (emphasis 
added).) The court found that the police here conducted the search "at the request and 
direction of his parole officer," and therefore the delegation did not exceed constitutional 
limitations. (Opinion, p.8.) The Court of Appeals incorrectly decided this issue of first 
impression, which warrants review of this case. 
First, the Opinion relied on one inopposite case regarding legislative delegation 
to find that the non-delegation doctrine applies only to a delegation of decision-making 
authority: 
Only when constitutionally entrusted decision-making authority is 
delegated to another branch of government will the non-delegation 
doctrine be implicated. See, e.g., State v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 543 
(1977) (discussing the standards for determining 'whether a legislative 
delegation of decision making authority is constitutionally proper'). 
(See Opinion, p.7 (emphasis added).) But Kellogg did not hold, or even imply, that the 
non-delegation doctrine applies only to a delegation of decision-making authority 
regardless of the type of duty the delegating entity is charged with. 5 Kellogg's framing 
5 The relevant passage from Kellogg states: 
In considering whether a legislative delegation of decision making 
authority is constitutionally proper, this court held in Boise Redevelopment 
Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972) that: "It is 
clear that the legislative power of the state is by our Constitution vested in 
the Senate and House of Representatives and it is a fundamental principle 
of representative government that, except as authorized by organic law, 
the legislative department cannot delegate any of its power to make laws 
to any other body or authority. It is also clear, however, as stated in 
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of the issue therefore cannot be blindly applied to a delegation of the Board's duty to 
control, direct, and manage parole. 
To the contrary, what amounts to an impermissible delegation necessarily 
depends on the specific duties the constitution places on the delegating entity. 
See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon 
The Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 133 (6th ed. 1890) (the 
"powers ... specifically conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any 
other specified officer," must be performed by that officer); In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 
128 Idaho 246, 260 (1995) (recognizing "the power of the courts to ultimately decide the 
cases presented to them, granted by Article V, Section 20 of the Constitution, has never 
been, and can never be, delegated to executive agencies."). Crucially, the Idaho 
Constitution gives the Board and its employees the exclusive duty to control, direct, and 
manage parole, including on-the-ground supervision of parolees. See Report of Prison 
Committee, Appointed January 5, 1940, (the "Report"), p. 6 (probation and parole's 
"now unsatisfactory operation is based upon the fact that there is a complete dirth of 
qualified administration officers, therefore, it can be truthfully said that we have no 
system of parole and probation of a scientific type whatsoever.") (emphasis added), p.7 
("The supervision of the paroled offender should be exercised by qualified persons 
trained and experienced in the task of guiding social readjustment.") (emphasis added); 
State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 231 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that "[fjor probation 
Foeller v. Housing Authority of Portland, 198 Or. 205, 256 P.2d 752, 780 
(1953), that: "Although the legislature cannot delegate its power to make 
a law or complete one, it can empower an agency or an official to 
ascertain the existence of the facts or conditions mentioned in the act 
upon which the law becomes operative." 
98 Idaho at 543 (internal citations omitted). 
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authorities to evaluate a probationer's progress in reintegrating into society, the 
probation officer must have a thorough understanding of the probationer's environment 
and personal habits."). Therefore, the Board cannot delegate any part of its duties, and 
the on-call parole officer's delegation of that duty runs afoul of the non-delegation 
doctrine. 
Second, the Court of Appeals incorrectly found that "this case d[id] not involve 
any delegation of decision-making authority whatsoever" because the police here 
conducted the search "under the direction of the parole officer." (Opinion, pp.7-8.) 
Mr. Armstrong does not disagree that "[a] parole officer may ... enlist the aid of the 
police when conducting a justified search." State v. Peters, 130 Idaho 960, 62 (Ct. App. 
·1997) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 233 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(a parole officer "may enlist the aid of police officers in performing his duty." (emphasis 
added)). But the Idaho Appellate Courts have not condoned searches in which a parole 
officer delegated his entire duty and was not even present for the search. See State v. 
Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 907 (Ct. App. 2007) (in which a parole officer and two police 
officers searched a parolee's residence); Peters, 130 Idaho at 961 (in which a parole 
officer decided to search a parolee, asked local police to assist him in the search of a 
parolee's residence, and stood outside while the police conducted the search); State v. 
Vega, 110 Idaho 685, 687 (Ct. App. 1986) (in which a parole officer and police officer 
searched a parolee's residence); Pinson, 104 Idaho at 230 (in which a probation officer 
and police officer searched the probationer's home). Indeed, "[c]ourts have perceived a 
distinction between searches of probationers conducted by a supervising probation 
officer and those conducted by the police. The 'special and unique' interest which 
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probation authorities have in invading the privacy of probationers 'does not extend to 
law enforcement officers generally."' Pinson, 104 Idaho at 233 (internal citations 
omitted). 
Here, the on-call parole officer, Ms. Jeffries, did not merely "enlist the aid" of the 
local police "in performing [her] duty." See Pinson, 104 Idaho at 233. She in fact 
delegated her entire duty to search, and was not present for that search even though 
she could have been. (See Tr., p.44, Ls.23--25.) Further, although the Boise Police 
conducted the search of Mr. Armstrong's vehicle at the request of Ms. Jeffries, they did 
not conduct the search under Ms. ,Jeffries' direction. Again, Ms. Jeffries was not 
present for the search and the only instructions she gave to the Boise Police was that 
that they should conduct a K9 search and let her know whether they found anything. 
(Tr., p.38, L.21 -- p.40, L.24, p.44, Ls.12-25.) Nothing in the record indicates, for 
example, that Ms. Jeffries asked the police to place the drug dog inside Mr. Armstrong's 
car to search. (See Tr., p.38, Ls.21-23 (Ms. Jeffries responding that she "requested a 
K9 search" when asked whether she requested a "general search or a specific type of 
search"), p.51, Ls.6-10 (Officer Chally responding that Ms. Jeffries "requested a K9 
search, drug detection K9 search" when asked whether Ms. Jeffries requested a 
"specific type of search"), p.89, Ls.10-12 (Officer Wal bey answering affirmatively when 
asked whether Officer Chally requested that he perform a K9 search).) But that is 
precisely what the police did. (Tr., p.89, Ls.15-19 (Officer Walbey stating: "I got the 
dog out. I walked around the vehicle. I didn't see any obvious hazards. At that point I 
had the clog sniff the exterior of the vehicle and the interior subsequently after that.")). It 
thus appears that the police did in fact make decisions regarding the scope of the 
17 
search. The Idaho Appellate Courts have not previously condoned such a broad 
delegation. See Cruz, 144 Idaho at 907; Peters, 130 Idaho at 961; Vega, 110 Idaho at 
687; Pinson, ·104 Idaho at 230. 
Ms. Jeffries' complete delegation of her duty, as opposed to asking the police for 
mere assistance with a search, runs afoul of the non-delegation doctrine. The Court of 
Appeals incorrectly decided this issue of first impression, and thus this Court should 
review this case. 
IL 
Given That Article X Section 5 Of The Idaho Constitution S ecificall Places The Out 
To Control Direct And Mana e Parole On The Board Of Correction The District Court 
Erred When It Determined That An On-Call Probation And Parole Officer Can Delegate 
That Constitutional Du To Local Police Thus Making Them Agents Of The Board 
The district court erred by denying Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress. Article 
X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution places the exclusive duty to direct, control, and 
manage parolees on the Board of Correction. Because that constitutionally-placed duty 
is non-delegable, the on-call parole officer's attempted delegation of that duty failed. 
Therefore, the Boise Police could not have been agents of probation and parole within 
the terms of Mr. Armstrong's parole agreement. 
A. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The appellate 
court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence, but it can freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). "While this Court gives 
serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals when considering a case on 
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review from that court, it reviews the district court's decision directly." Loomis, 146 
ldallo at 702 (citing State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 819,821 (2007)). 
B. This Court Should Reject The State's Invitation To Place Additional Burdens On 
A Defendant Who Has Established That Evidence Was Seized During A 
Warrantless Search 
As an initial matter, the Article X, § 5 issue is properly before this court. In its 
response brief below, the State asserted that because "[Mr.] Armstrong did not argue 
that Article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution ipso facto prevented the parole officer from 
allowing law enforcement officers from other agencies to act as her agent," so 
Mr. Armstrong failed to preserve the issue and this Court should not consider it. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9--10.) The Court of Appeals agreed. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) The 
Court of Appeals further explained that, even though Mr. Armstrong met his burden of 
production when he established that the police conducted the search without a warrant, 
meeting that burden did not relieve Mr. Armstrong of the requirements of preserving 
arguments for appeal. (Opinion, p.6, n.3.) Mr. Armstrong contends that the Court of 
Appeals erred in finding that Mr. Armstrong failed to preserve the constitutional issue. 
"The burden is on a defendant to show the illegality of a search; however, once 
the search is shown to have been made without a warrant, the search is deemed to be 
unreasonable per se ... " State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842 (1999). The burden of 
proof then rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486 (2004) (citation omitted). When 
the State seeks to rely upon the consent exception to the warrant requirement, "[t]he 
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burden is on the State to show that the consent exception applies." State v. Hansen, 
151 Idaho 342, 346 (20·11 ). 
Despite the State's claims to the contrary, Mr. Armstrong met his burden of proof 
below when he objected to the admission of the evidence and the State conceded that 
the police discovered the evidence during a warrantless search of Mr. Armstrong's 
vehicle. See Tucker, 132 Idaho at 842. By doing so, Mr. Armstrong preserved the only 
issue he needed to preserve---the warrant!ess search of his vehicle. 
Although Mr. Armstrong acknowledges that he did not specifically raise Article X, 
Section 5, he could not have waived the ability to address that issue on appeal. First, it 
was the State's affirmative burden to prove that the police were agents of probation and 
parole, including that the duty to perform a parole search was delegable in the first 
place. See Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486. Second, Mr. Armstrong did argue below, as 
he argued on appeal, that the police were not "agents" of probation and parole. 
( See Appellant's Brief, p.12) The State's failure to establish a necessary prerequisite to 
agency does not prevent this Court from addressing the question. 
Moreover, the cases cited by the State and the Court of Appeals do not support 
the contention that Mr. Armstrong waived this issue. The State cited to three cases to 
support its argument, in which either the objection, grounds for the objection, or relief 
requested were different below than on appeal. State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 
883-4 (2005) (in which this Court declined to address whether a witness should have 
been excluded from testifying as a discovery violation sanction because the defendant 
never requested a sanction in the trial court); State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454 
(1993) (finding that the defendant failed to preserve his argument regarding testimony's 
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helpfulness because the d€3fendant objected only to the lack of foundation for testimony 
below); State v. Holland, ·135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000) (declining to address the 
constitutionality of a seizure when the defendant oniy challenged the search below); 
see also State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 596-597 (1992) (cited by the Opinion, p.5 
(declining to address the defendant's objection to admitting a child abuse expert's 
testimony under I.RE. 404(a)(1) because below the grounds for that objection were that 
the testimony would be merely conclusory in nature regarding the veracity of the 
victim).) 
Here, on the other hand, Mr. Armstrong asserted the same objection, grounds for 
the objection, and requested relief below and on appeal. Additionally, in none of the 
above cases did this Court hold that a defendant has the burden of objecting to, and 
disproving, each of the exceptions to the warrant requirement asserted by the State. 
Rather, this Court has clearly stated that the burden to prove an exception to the 
warrant requirement is on the State. See Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486. 
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are similarly off-point. The majority of 
those cases involved a defendant's failure to even object in the first place. See State v. 
Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009) (declining to address the defendant's 
argument that the trial court should have sua sponte removed a biased juror because 
the defendant did not object to seating a juror at trial); State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 
940 (1994) (declining to address the defendant's challenge to admitting the testimony of 
lay witnesses regarding whether the victim was suicidal because the defendant did not 
make that objection to the testimony below); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195 (1992) 
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(declining to address the defendant's arguments regarding the lesser included offenses 
statute, I.C. § ·19--2'132, because the defendant did not object to tho statute below). 
The Court of Appeals also cited to a handful of cases in which the defendant 
failed to sufficiently raise a threshold issue and therefore waived it State v. Frederick, 
149 Idaho 509, 513 (2010) (holding that because the defendant mentioned Article I, 
Sections 13 and ·1? of the Idaho Constitution only in passing, he could not argue on 
appeal that those sections afford greater protections than the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution; State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407 (1992) (same); State v. 
Headley, 130 Idaho 339, 340 (1997) (declining to address the defendant's argument 
that the officer had no authority to arrest him under I.C. § 49-·1407 because below the 
defendant argued only that there was no probable cause for his arrest); State v. 
Contreras-Gonzales, 146 Idaho 41, 47 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the defendant failed 
to preserve his argument, in support of his objection for lack of foundation, that the 
State had failed to establish the reliability of test performed by a machine used to test 
methamphetamine because below he argued only that the machine lacked some sort of 
certification). 
But here, Mr. Armstrong moved to suppress the evidence under both the U.S. 
and Idaho Constitutions, proved the Boise Police searched his vehicle without a 
warrant, and, when it was the State's burden to show that the consent exception 
applied, Mr. Armstrong also specifically disagreed with the State's assertion that the 
Boise Police were "agents" of probation and parole. Cases such as Frederick, 
Wheaton, Hidley, and Contreras-Gonzalez, in which the defendant failed to raise a 
threshold issue, are thus inapplicable to this case. 
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Finally, none of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals undermine 
Mr. Armstrong's argument that because he had me his burden of proof below he could 
not have waived this issue, and the Court of Appeals failed to meaningfully address that 
argument. (See Opinion, pp.4-6 & n.3.) The court only mentioned that argument in a 
footnote, in which it acknowledged that Mr. Armstron~J met his burden of production 
when he established that the police conducted the search without a warrant, but found 
that meeting that burden did not relieve Mr. Armstrong of the requirements of preserving 
arguments for appeal. (See Opinion, p.6 n.3.) The Court of Appeals did not, however, 
cite any case !aw to support that contention. (Id.) Given that the practical effect of the 
Court of Appeal's holding places an additional burden on a defendant who has shown 
that the police conducted a search without a warrant, the holding conflicts with the 
general assignment of burdens of proof in search and seizure cases and should be 
reversed. See Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486. 
C. The Boise Police Could Not Have Been Agents Of Probation And Parole Per The 
Terms Of Mr. Armstrong's Parole Agreement Because Article X, Section 5 Of 
The Idaho Constitution Places A Non-Delegable Duty To Control, Direct And 
Manage Parole On The Board Of Correction 
Mr. Armstrong waived his constitutional right to be free from searches "by any 
agent of [probation and parole]." (Ex.1 to 7/3/13 Suppression Hearing.) The district 
court denied Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress finding, "[t]he parole agent in this case 
authorized Boise City Police Officers to act in her place in conducting a search of the 
Defendant's vehicle. This is the very definition of an agent." (R., pp.116-117.) At the 
heart of this ruling, and what it presupposes, is that Ms. Jeffries, an on-call parole 
officer, had the authority to delegate the Board's constitutional duty to control, direct, 
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and manage parole to another entity. Because Ms. Jeffries did not have that authority, 
the district court erred in finding that Boise Police officers who conducted the search 
were agents of probation and parole under the terms of Mr. Armstrong's waiver. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Armstrong's motion to 
suppress. 
1. Article X, Section 5 Specifically Places The Out{ To Control, Direct, And 
Manage Parole On The Board Of Correction 
The Idaho Constitution creates the Board of Correction which has "the control, 
direction and management of ... adult probation and parole, with such compensation, 
powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law." ID. CONST. art. X, § 5. Although the 
''[l]egislature implemented this constitutional directive by enacting" statutes, "the 
enabling acts of the [l]egislature involved no delegation of legislative authority." 
Mellinger v. State Dept. of Corrs., 114 Idaho 494, 499 (Ct. App. 1988). Rather, "[t]he 
Board ultimately derives its powers from article 10, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution." Id. 
In interpreting this section, the Idaho Supreme Court has found that, although the 
legislature may define the circumstances under which the Board may exercise its 
authority, the Board continues to have exclusive control over parole once those 
circumstances arise. Determining whether a defendant is eligible for parole during his 
sentence "is within the legislative scope of establishing suitable punishment for the 
various crimes . . Standlee v. State, 96 Idaho 849, 852 (1975). Thus, "the 
circumstances under which the functions are to be exercised by the state board of 
corrections are to be prescribed by the laws enacted by the [l]egislature." State v. 
Rawson, 100 Idaho 308, 313 (1979). 'The board of correction continues to have 
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exclusive control over adult probation and parole in those situations where the 
legislature has provided by law that parole is available ... " Id. (emphasis added). 
Under this distribution of power, once an adult is placed on parole, the Board maintains 
exclusive control, direction, and management of that parolee. 
Moreover, the intent in placing the duty to control, direct, and manage parole in 
the Board was to professionalize parole supervision and have it executed by employees 
of the Board. In 1940, a prison committee submitted a report to Governor Bottlolfson 
regarding the "needs of the State Penitentiary and the Probation and Parole laws .... " 
Report, Cover Letter, p.1. The committee noted that "Idaho has has [sic] a probation 
and parole law on its statutes books, which includes many of the essential provisions for 
a good probation and parole system." Report, p.6. However, the committee recognized 
that there were problems with the current system: "Its now unsatisfactory operation is 
based upon the fact that there is a complete dirth of qualified administration officers, 
therefore, it can be truthfully said that we have no system of parole and probation of a 
scientific type whatsoever." Id. 
The committee recommended a series of changes to better effectuate a 
probation and parole system. Report, pp.1-2, 6-7. For example, the committee 
believed that "[t]he supervision of the paroled offender should be exercised by qualified 
persons trained and experienced in the task of guiding social readjustment." Report, 
p.7. The committee also recommended that then Article X, Section 5 be completely 
stricken from the Idaho Constitution: "This will permit the state legislature then to set up 
a separate board of penal administration and a board of probation and parole or to 
combine the two in the interest of economy." Report, p.9. Finally, the committee 
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suggested that Idaho create a new non-political Board of Correction to also serve as a 
board of 8du!t probation and parole, a supervisor of probation and parole, and a 
probation and parole system with full-time, joint probation and parole officers assigned 
to "serve the courts of ~1is district as a Probation Officer and the State penitentiary as a 
Parole Officer." Report, pp.1, 7. 
Although Idaho implemented many of the proposed changes, they were not 
implemented in exactly the way the committee recommended. Instead of simply striking 
Article X, Section 5 from the constitution, the legislature amended that provision in ·t 941 
and the people ratified it in 1942. Rather than leaving the decision of who would 
supervise parolees to the legislature, the people of Idaho, through the Idaho 
Constitution, mandated that the Board of Correction have that duty. 
The state legislature shall establish a nonpartisan board to be known as 
the state board of correction. . . . This board shall have the control, 
direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state, their 
employees and properties, and of adult probation and parole, with such 
compensation, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law. 
ID. CONST. art. X, § 5. In 1947, the legislature passed enabling statutes establishing the 
Board of Correction. 1947 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 53, §§ 1-47. These session 
laws recognized the Board's authority to employ and fix the duties of officers "for the 
administration of the parole and probation system ... " Id. at§ 14. 
This history shows that, with the purpose of professionalizing the parole system, 
the people of Idaho placed the on-the-ground duty to control, direct, and manage 
parolees on the Board of Correction and its employees. 
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2. Because ThQ Duty' To Control, Direct, And Manage Parole Has Been 
Constitutionally Placed On The Board Of Correction It Cannot Be 
Delegated To Another Entity 
Where the sovereign power of the State, meaning the people, have located 
certain authority it must remain. Cooley, supra, ·137; Cf State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 
228 P. 796, 797 ("1924) (relying upon Cooley to find, "[o]ne of the settled maxims in 
constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the [l]egislature to make laws cannot 
be delegated by that department to any other body or authority."); In re SRBA Case 
No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 260 (recognizing "the power of the courts to ultimately decide 
the cases presented to them, granted by Article V, Section 20 of the Constitution, has 
never been, and can never be, delegated to executive agencies."). In specific reference 
to the executive duties, "such powers as are specifically conferred by the constitution 
upon the governor, or upon any other specified officer, the legislature cannot require or 
authorize to be performed by any other officer or authority; and from those duties which 
the constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law." Cooley, supra, 133. 
Because the people of the State of Idaho constitutionally mandated that the 
Board have the duty to supervise parolees, the Board cannot excuse itself of that duty 
by delegating it to another entity such as a local police force. 
3. Because That Duty Is Non-Delegable, The Boise Police Officers Were Not 
Agents Of Probation And Parole 
An agent is a person authorized to act for or in the place of the principal. 
Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 151 (2005). "Any person who is sui juris and has 
capacity to affect his or her legal relationships by giving consent to a delegable act or 
transaction may authorize an agent to act for him or her with the same effect as if such 
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person were to act in person." Edwards v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 
154 Idaho 5·11, 517 (20·13) (citing 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 9 (2002)). However, "[i]f 
performance of an act is not delegable, its performance by an agent does not constitute 
performance by the principal." Restatement (Third) Of Agency§ 3.04(3) (2006). 
As argued above, the constitutional duty to supervise parolees is non-delegable. 
Thus, the search of Mr. Armstrong's car conducted by the Boise Police does not 
constitute a search conducted by probation and parole. See Restatement (Third) Of 
Agency § 3.04(3). Simply put, the officers were not agents of probation and parole 
because the on-call parole officer, like the legislature, did not have the power to 
delegate the Board's duty to supervise parolees. 
4. Because Mr. Armstrong's Waiver Only Encompassed Actual Agents Of 
Probation And Parole, The Warrantless Search Violated Mr. Armstrong'§ 
Constitutional Rights To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And 
Seizures 
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ID. CONST. art. I,§ 17. A search without a warrant is 
per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 444-45 (1971); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One such exception to the warrant requirement is a 
search conducted with consent voluntarily given by a person who has the authority to do 
so. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). "It is well settled 
that when the basis for a search is consent, the state must conform its search to the 
limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent." State v. Turek, 
150 Idaho 745, 749 (Ct. App. 2011 ). "The standard for measuring the scope of a 
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consent to search is that of objective reasonableness." State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 
731 (2002) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). The Court must 
exclude evidence discovered during an illegal search as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484--86 (1963); see also State v. Koivu, 
·152 Idaho 511, 518-·l 9 (2012) (holding that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created 
remedy for searches and seizures that violate the constitution). 
The scope of Mr. Armstrong's waiver was limited to searches conducted by 
agents of probation and parole. (Ex.1 to 7/3/13 Suppression Hearing (Mr. Armstrong 
would "submit to a search of person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at 
any time and place by any agent of [probation and parole) and s/he does waive 
constitutional right to be free frorn such searches.").) As argued above, the Boise Police 
officers were not agents of probation and parole. The search of Mr. Armstrong's vehicle 
exceeded the scope of Mr. Armstrong's waiver and was therefore not conducted 
pursuant to a valid exception to the warrant requirement. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
222; Turek, 150 Idaho at 7 49. The evidence obtained as a result should have been 
excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-86; State v. 
Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518-19. The district court erred when it denied Mr. Armstrong's 
motion to suppress. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Armstrong respecifully requests that this Court grant review of all the issues 
in this case. Assuming it does, Mr. Armstrong further asks the Court to reverse the 
district court order denying his motion to suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand 
his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2015. 
MAYA P. 'WALDRON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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